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COMMENTS

DEFINING THE SPECTER OF CORRUPTION:
AUSTIN v. MICHIGAN STATE CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE*
The conscription of truth should never be undertaken lightly. The
men who propose suppressions, in Congress and elsewhere, speak
much of the dangers against which they are guarding, but they rarely
consider the new dangers which they are creating or the great value of
what they are taking away. **

INTRODUCTION

The role of corporations in American politics has been a
source of legislative concern" since the beginning of the century
and a source of litigation for almost as long. 2 Recently, in Austin
v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the United States Supreme Court upheld provisions of Michigan's Campaign Act that
prohibit corporations from expending general treasury funds to
110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
* Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Does Freedom of Speech Really Tend to ProduceTruth?,
in THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 334 (Haig Bosmajian ed., 1971).
' Early attempts at regulating corporate participation in politics include the Tillman Act of 1907, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 and the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947. The Tillman Act made it unlawful "for any national bank or corporation... to
make a money contribution in connection with any election to any political office." Ch.
420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1948) (repealed 1976)). The Federal
Corrupt Practices Act broadened the definition of "money" to include "in kind" contributions. Ch. 368, §302, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925). The Taft-Hartley Act extended prohibitions
to expenditures in addition to contributions. Ch. 120, §304, 61 Stat. 136, 159-60 (1947).
For a history of legislative regulation of corporate financial activity in political campaigns, see United States v. International Union United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567,
570-84 (1957); John R. Bolton, ConstitutionalLimitations on Regulating Corporateand
Union Political Speech, 22 ARIz. L. Rav. 373, 374-402 (1980).
2 See United States v. United States Brewers Ass'n, 239 F. 163, 169 (W.D. Pa. 1916)
(holding that Congress had the authority to enact the Tillman Act and that the Act did
not abridge defendant's right to free speech).
*
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support or oppose a candidate in a state election. Although the
Michigan State Chamber's proposed expenditure was "independent," i.e., made without coordination with a candidate or his
election committee, the Court found that the requirement that
such expenditures be made from segregated funds was justified
by the compelling state interest in preventing corruption. Notably, this was the first time that the Supreme Court had found an
expenditure restriction constitutional as applied.
This Comment will review the Court's decision in Austin. It
will discuss the governmental interest in preventing corruption
as defined by the Court and conclude that Austin's definition of
corruption was a marked departure from the traditional construction. Previous Courts have considered corruption as the
trading of money by a constituent for political favors from a
candidate. The Austin Court, on the other hand, defined corruption to include what it found was the unfair influence of corporate money on the outcome of an election. Specifically, the Austin Court objected to the use of corporate general treasury funds
for political purposes because those monies reflected economic
success and not political support. This Comment will suggest
that the Court offered only a perfunctory explanation for adopting its position, one which warranted a more authoritative and
persuasive discussion. Further, this Comment will argue that in
abandoning the traditional definition, the Court also abandoned
the underlying justification for restricting speech to prevent corruption. Finally, this Comment will conclude that this broad
definition of corruption renders the electoral process unreasonably susceptible to legislative intervention and may ultimately
chill certain forms of corporate political speech.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment 4
The Supreme Court had previously considered a similar provision in a federal law
but ruled that the expenditure restrictions could not be applied constitutionally to a
small, nontraditional corporation. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986). For a discussion of Massachusetts Citizens, see notes
86-103 & 114-29 and accompanying text infra.
U.S. CONST. amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free practice thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

1991]

CORPORATE SPEECH

of the United States Constitution to limit government's "power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content." 5 Because "[it can hardly be doubted
that the [First Amendment's] constitutional guarantee has its
fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office," 8 election finance law has been
7
Accordingly, the Court's analsubjected to "exacting scrutiny."1
ysis in campaign finance cases has turned on whether the specific regulation implicated constitutionally protected freedoms,
whether such burden was outweighed by a compelling government interest, and whether the regulation had been narrowly
8
tailored to that interest.
In 1976 the Supreme Court decided Buckley v. Valeo,°

which has since become the landmark case in election finance
law. In Buckley the Supreme Court considered various challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act [FECA] Amendments of 1974.10 For purposes of analyzing Austin, however, the

Government for a redress of grievances.
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). In Mosley the Court
invalidated an ordinance limiting picketing near school buildings to those schools involved in labor disputes. The Court found that the ordinance defined permissible picketing on the basis of its subject matter. The Court ruled that this was not a contentneutral regulation, and that it could not be justified as the city's attempt to regulate
merely on the "time, place or manner" of expression. Mosley, 408 US. at 99. See also
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (upholding individual's right to protest the draft
by displaying profane message on clothing); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 US. 205
(1975) (striking ordinance prohibiting films with nudity from being showm at drive-in
movie theatre).
6 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971), quoted in Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
7 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45. The Court set this standard for judicial scrutiny after
reaching the threshold determination that regulations aimed at the giving and spending
of money in connection with candidate elections operated in the sphere of core political
expression. The Court rejected the government's contention that election finance legislation regulated conduct, and "its effect on speech and association were incidental at
most." Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
9 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
,o In order to curtail political corruption, Congress, in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974 [hereinafter FECA], developed an intricate
scheme for regulating federal political campaigns. Federal Election Campaign Act, as
amended 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (18 U.S.C. § 608 (1974) (repealed
1976)). Among its restrictions, the Act imposed ceilings on the amount of money that
could be contributed to candidates as well as on expenditures made independent of campaigns, but for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat of candidates. 18 U.S.C. §
608 (repealed 1976). The Act also included reporting and disclosure requirements. In

1 Police
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most significant aspect of the Buckley decision was the distinction the Court found between regulating contributions-the giving of money directly to a candidate-and regulating expenditures-the spending of money in connection with a candidate
without coordination with the candidate or campaign 'committee.
The Court held that the regulation of contributions did not impose the same interference with protected expression as did the
regulation of expenditures. 1 Furthermore, unregulated contributions posed a substantially greater threat
to the electoral process
12
expenditures.
than did unrestricted
The appellants in Buckley opposed both FECA's contribution and expenditure provisions. As enacted, FECA limited individuals and groups to a $1,000 contribution per candidate, with
an annual ceiling of $25,000 in contributions. 13 The Act capped
expenditures by an individual or group at $1,000 per candidate,
per election. 4 Appellants argued that any limit on a dollar
amount that individuals and associations could use toward political purposes impinged on First Amendment guarantees."5 The
Court conceded that in today's society virtually all political
speech involves the spending of money; producing even the most

addition, amendments to the Internal Revenue Code provided for a system of public
financing of presidential elections and established the Federal Election Commission to
administer and enforce the legislation.
Senator Buckley, joined by a candidate for the presidency, a potential contributor, a
Political Action Committee, The Conservative Party of the State of New York, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, the New York Civil Liberties Union,
Inc., the American Conservative Union, the Conservative Victory Fund, and Human
Events, Inc. challenged these provisions as unconstitutional violations of their First
Amendment rights of freedom of expression and association. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7-8.
" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.
2 Id. at 47. The Court determined that contributions were more likely to incur political debts than would expenditures which were made without consultation with a candidate or candidate committee. Id. at 26-27. See notes 38-41 and accompanying text
infra.
.3 88 Stat. 1263, 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1974) (repealed 1976). The statute uses the term
"person" which it defines broadly to include "an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, or any other organization or group of persons." Id. § 591(g). In
addition, the statute authorized a higher limitation on contributions by a "political committee," provided it had been registered with the Federal Election Commission for no
less than six months, had received donations from more than fifty persons, and, except
for state political parties, had contributed to the campaigns of more than five candidates
for federal office. Id. § 608(b)(2).
4 88 Stat. 1263, 18'U.S.C. § 608 (1974) (repealed 1976).
" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
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modest handbill assumes some cost.16 To that extent the Court

recognized that both contribution and expenditure provisions
implicated the First Amendment,17 yet it nonetheless upheld the
Act's contribution provisions' s and invalidated only the Act's expenditure provisions." The Court permitted the limitations on
contributions, finding that they posed only a "marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication."2 0 In the first place, the dollar limitation affected only donations made to candidates and their election committees. It did
not affect the contributor's ability to discuss public issues or donate money to other political organizations. Second, the Court
posited that allowing a contributor to make larger contributions
did not allow him more expression. 21 According to the Court,

"[t]he quantity of communication by the contributor does not
increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution since the
expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of
contributing.

22

The Court found that limiting contributions to

a particular dollar amount still allowed the contributor to enjoy

11

Id. at 11.

17 Id. at 23.

Is Id. at 29.
19
70

Id. at 51, 55-57.
Id. at 20-21. The Court stated that the effect on the giver was the "primary" First

Amendment problem with § 608(b). Id. at 24-25. Nonetheless the Court also examined
the contribution provisions from the perspective of the donee, albeit in the context of an
equal protection challenge. Id. at 30-35. The Court noted that the restrictions were
facially neutral, applying equally to incumbents and challengers, major party candidates
as well as minor party candidates. Id. at 31 n.33. Overall, based on the evidence before it,
the Court concluded that there had been no showing that contribution limitations were
discriminatory in effect. Id. at 32, 33-34.
21 Id. at 21. The Court admitted that the size of a contribution might be an indication of the intensity of the contributor's support for a candidate. Id. However, the Court
noted that the size of a contribution may also be affected by factors which have little
bearing on the intensity of political support, for instance, the contributor's financial ability and past contribution history. Id. at 21 n.22.
2 Id. at 21. The Court was careful to explain that contributions result in political
expression "if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters," but
"the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone
other than the contributor." Id. This observation was critical to the Court's finding that
a contributor was not unduly burdened by contribution ceilings. Similarly, the Court
used this rationale in California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182
(1978), wherein the Court sustained limitations of the amount of money an unincorporated organization could contribute to a multicandidate campaign committee. In California Medical the Court referred to contributions as "speech by proxy," the regulation of
which entailed non-fatal intrusions into protected expression. Id. at 196.
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the symbolic expression of giving.2 3 More importantly, contribution ceilings did not foreclose the contributor from pursuing
other, more direct avenues of political expression, such as joining political associations, and working on behalf of candidates.2 '
The net effect of limiting contributions, according to the
Court, was that candidates must raise funds from a greater number of sources, and the giver must explore more direct means of
political expression.2z The Court balanced this burden on the
contributor's First Amendment freedoms with the governmental
interests behind regulating contributions.2 6 Applying a "rigorous
standard of review, ' 27 the Court noted that even significant intrusions into protected rights may be sustained where the State
demonstrated "a sufficiently important interest and employs
means closely drawn. '"2 The Court then examined Congress's interest in preventing corruption "spawned by the real or
imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on
candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office." 2
Finding this interest was sufficiently compelling to subordinate a
contributor's protected expression, the Court then questioned
whether contribution restrictions were narrowly tailored to this
purpose.3 0
In this regard, the Court determined that contribution restrictions focused on the narrow problem of the effect of large
campaign contributions on the actuality or perception of politi-

22 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
2, Id. at 22.
25 Id.

'6 In addition to the "primary" intere in corruption prevention, the Court cited
two "ancillary" interests advanced by the government. Id. at 25-26. First, the contribution and expenditure limits combined would have the effect of equalizing the relative

ability of citizens to affect elections. Id. Second, the limits would put a brake on the
skyrocketing costs of election campaigns. Id. at 26. The Court noted that for this latter
purpose expenditure limits would be more effective than contribution limits, as expenditure ceilings would cap the aggregate cost of campaigns and not merely force the candidate to pursue a greater number of sources of funding. Id. at 26 n.27. The Court, however, rejected both of these "ancillary" rationales. Id. at 48-49, 57.

" Id. at 29. The Court also referred to its standard of review as "exacting." Id. at
44-45. The Court explained its application of rigorous scrutiny as applicable to limitations on "core First Amendment rights." Id. at 45.
28 Id. at 25 (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975)). See also NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
2'Buckley, 424 U.S. a.t 26.
20 Id.
at 28-29.
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cal corruption. 1 The Court explored less intrusive alternatives
to the FECA provision, such as laws against bribery and laws
requiring financial disclosure from candidates. However, it concluded that neither measure was well suited to Congress's purpose in enacting FECA 2 Moreover, neither of these alternatives
stemmed the perception that improper influence of government
has been achieved through massive contributions. Given the
weight of the government's interest, and the relatively slight intrusion into protected rights, the Court upheld the contribution
ceilings.3 3
The Court found that expenditure ceilings, unlike contribution ceilings, "impose[d] direct and substantial restraints on the
quantity of political speech.'
Whereas contribution limits
served only to redirect, at a certain dollar amount, a contributor's participation in politics, the plain effect of expenditure limitations was to restrict speech to a dollar amount. After reaching
the applicable dollar amount, a contributor could, decide, for example, to purchase radio time to express political views. With
expenditure limits, however, one's speech ended at the applicable dollar amount, however it was expended. Accordingly, expenditure restrictions limited the quantity of expression, in terms of
the audience reached or the number of issues discussed.3 5 In this
way expenditure limits foreclosed "any significant use of the
most effective modes of communication," simply because the
costs of these alternate modes of political expression might be
prohibitively large relative to the expenditure ceiling.30 The
Court deemed this result a markedly greater burden on political
speech than that imposed by contribution ceilings, which only

11Id. at 28. The Court found that the avoidance of the appearance of corruption
was almost as compelling an interest as avoiding actual corruption: "the avoidance of the
appearance of improper influence 'is also critical... if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent."' Id.at 27 (quoting
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28 (bribery laws would be effective against only the most
blatant conduct); id. at 28 (disclosure provisions would be of limited effect in this context, a partial measure that would not stem political deal making). See the Court's discussion of disclosure as serving other crucial functions, such as communication with the
public. Id.at 60-84.
3Id.at 29.

Id. at 39.
19.
36Id.at 19-20.
3

5 Id. at
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affected a single means of expression, the giving of money to a
candidate.3
The Court refused to hold that expenditure ceilings were an
appropriate means of safeguarding the electoral process, insisting that unregulated independent expenditures did not pose the
same threats of real or apparent corruption as did unregulated
contributions.3 8 Not only did expenditures not suggest improper
influence on a candidate, the Court found that expenditures
might actually prove to be a thorn to candidates." The Court
found that: "The absence of prearrangement and coordination of
an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermine[d] the value of the expenditure to a candidate, but also
alleviate[d] the danger that expenditures [would] be given as
' 40
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.
Accordingly the Court found that the same interest in safeguarding the electoral process which was sufficient to justify limitations on contributions, was insufficient with respect to limitations on expenditures. Finding no potential for actual or
perceived political quid pro quo arrangements, the Court struck
the expenditure provisions.41
Two years after Buckley considered the effect of election
law on candidate elections, the Supreme Court examined election law in the context of referenda and ballot issues. In First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti42 the Court struck down a
Massachusetts statute that prohibited banks and corporations
from making contributions or expenditures "for the purpose of
. . . influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted
to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the
property, business or assets of the corporation. ' 43 In considering

at 44.
" Id. at 47-48.

37 Id.

" Id. at 47. Indeed the Court determined that, "[u]nlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and
indeed may prove counterproductive." Id.
40 Id.
"I Id. at 51.
42 435 U.S. 765 (1978). This case is widely referred to as the "corporate speech"
case, although the Court expressly deferred deciding whether restrictions on corporate

speech might be justified where restrictions on an individual's speech would not. Id. at
777 n.13.
41 Id. at 768 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)). The
Court's holding in Bellotti extended equally to corporate contributions and corporate
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the case, the Court focused on the nature of the speech prohibited by the statute, rather than on the identity of the speaker."
The Court found that speech surrounding referendum issues was
"indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy"' 5 and that
the requirement that a corporation had to be "materially affect[ed]" was an impermissible restriction on speech .4 Moreover, the Court concluded that such speech did not lose its First
Amendment protection because the speaker was a corporation.'

expenditures, and both means of expression remain available to corporations in connection with referenda..
" Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776. In so doing, the Court shifted its emphasis from what
had been the lower court's focus, stating, "The proper question therefore is not whether
corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with
those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the Act] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect." Id.
"I Id.at 777.
4 Id. at 784.
47 Id. at 777 ("If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would
suggest that
the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a
corporation rather than an individual.").
Corporations have been considered "persons" for certain constitutional purposes,
however the extent of First Amendment protection afforded corporations has been unclear, due in part to the different theories underlying the rights connected with freedom
of expression. The extent to which corporations have enjoyed freedom of speech has depended upon whether the Court conceptualized the source of such a right to be the right
of self-realization, association, or the listener's right to hear. First, the constitution protects the use of communication as "a means of self-expression, self-realization and selffulfillment." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804. See also THo aS 'I. EMaEsoN, TOWARD A GENTRAL
THEORY OF THE FiRsT AaENDMiENT 4-7 (1966). This self-realization theory explains the
protection afforded an individual's speech. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (striking compulsory flag salute regulation as it "invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment" to protect). Simultaneously, an individual's self expression includes the right not
to speak. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (state may not force
motorist to carry state motto on license plate). This interest in self-realization has been
extended to protect expression by ideological organizations. The rights of the organization derive from the individual's rights, but may be asserted by the organization on behalf of its members. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60
(1958) (denying standing to the organization and requiring members to assert the right
themselves would force members to reveal information they sought to protect).
Subsequently, organizations were deemed protected by a First Amendment right in
association itself. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (the right of association protects" 'the common advancement of
political beliefs and ideas' ") (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1973)); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981) (right of association
protects "the practice of persons sharing common views banding together"); Federal
Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 494
(1985) (freedom of association protects "mechanisms by which large numbers of individ-
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The Court held that while preserving the integrity of the electoral process was an "interest of the highest importance,"4 8 the
risk of corruption "simply is not present in a popular vote on a
public issue."4 Bellotti emphasized that because referenda are

uals of modest means can join together in organizations which serve to 'amplify the voice
of their adherents.' ") (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22). The right of association, however, protects only that expression which is related to the ideological basis of the organization. Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 495 (contributions to PAC reflect agreement with its message); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986) ("The resources [MCFL] has available are . . . a function of its . . . popularity in the political marketplace."). Where the right of association
operates, it is as protective as the individual's right. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 ("IT]he
right of association ...'like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.' ")
(quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960)). "In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate, governmental 'action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.'" Buckley, 424 U.S. at
25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)). Accordingly, the right of association also protects organizations from being compelled to speak.
See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking state "right
of reply" statute that required newspapers to furnish equal space for candidate to rebut
criticisms).
The right of association vindicates the right of an individual or group to speak. But
freedom of expression serves the interests of society as a whole in making information
available. Another source of First Amendment protection focuses on the rights of the
listener, rather than those of the speaker. This "right to hear," "right to know," or "right
to information" rationale was the original basis of protection for commercial speech. See
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 756-57 (1976) (presupposing a willing speaker, consumers of prescription drugs can
assert right to receive advertising); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial
speech is based on the informational function of advertising.").
This so called "right to hear" has a functional political basis as well. The First
Amendment protects expression as a means of protecting our system of self-government:
The constitutional right of free expression ...is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of
us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas'for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people."). This author believes the political basis of the "right to hear" doctrine should
be controlling in corporate political speech cases.
" Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978). Note, however, that the Court rejected Massachusetts's contention that the statute should be upheld based on the state's interest in
protecting the minority shareholder who objects to corporate expenditures for political
purposes with which he disagrees. Id. at 792-95.
d.at 790.
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held on issues, not candidates, there is no opportunity to exact a
political debt. Consistent with Buckley, Bellotti held that there
had to be a threat of quid pro quo corruption to justify a restriction on speech.
In Bellotti the Court employed "exacting scrutiny" in its review of the Massachusetts statute. In FederalElection Commission v. NationalRight to Work Committee,0 however, the Court
appeared more deferential to legislative concerns, when it refused to "second-guess a legislative determination as to the need
for prophylactic measures where corruption [was] the evil
feared." 51 Specifically the Court in Right to Work upheld the
application to a nonprofit corporation of a restriction on the
sources from which its Political Action Committee, or segregated
fund, could solicit money.52 Arguably, the Court's lenient review
in Right to Work was not improper, as the Court considered
only a "contributions" issue, the constitutional status of which
3

Buckley had already explored.

In Right to Work the Court's emphasis was on the purpose
of FECA, which was designed "to ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go
with the corporate form of organization [would] not be converted into political 'war chests' which could be used to incur
0
"
62

459 U.S. 197 (1982).
Id. at 210.
Id. at 207 (referring to The Federal Campaign Act of 1971, 90 Stat. 490, 2 U.S.C.

§ 441b(b)(4)(A) which requires that contributions to such a segregated fund be solicited
only from members of the corporation). The Court construed the definition of "members" for a nonstock, nonmember corporation like NRWC not to include the 267,000
people solicited by mail for contributions. Instead, the Court suggested that members
play some part in the administration or operation of the corporation. Id. at 205-06.
The rationale behind the solicitation provision is that political fundraising by a
union or corporation should be limited to people intimately involved with the sponsoring
entity. A segregated fund may be totally controlled by the parent corporation or union,
in terms of the candidates it supports and by what means. It must be separate only
insofar as the money is not to be commingled with the other assets of the sponsoring
organization. See Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414-17
(1972).
" See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 495 (1985) (Right to Work was decided "in view of the well-established
constitutional validity of legislative regulation of corporate contributions to candidates
for public office."); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238, 259 (1986) ("[T]he political activity at issue in Right to Work was contributions, the
committee had been established for the purpose of making direct contributions to political candidates.").
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political debts. .... ,,54 In FederalElection Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee,5 however, the
Court returned its focus to the distinction between regulating
contributions and regulating expenditures as a means of
preventing corruption. Examining the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act,5" the Court again invalidated a restriction
on expenditures, 7 here ruling that expenditures by political
committees could not be curbed without a showing that expenditures tended "to corrupt or give the appearance of corruption. 5'" '
Consistent with Buckley, the Court in Conservative Political
Action Committee refused to sustain the restriction as a purely
prophylactic measure without evidence that expenditures, and
not just contributions, posed a problem of corruption., 9
In sum, by 1986 the Court had determined that election finance law operated in a sphere of protected freedoms. Limitations on both contributions and expenditures had received strict
scrutiny, whereby governmental constraints had to be justified
by compelling interests. The Court had recognized as compelling
the state's interest in preventing corruption, so long as the restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve those purposes. This
held true whether the speaker was an individual, a committee or
a corporation. Although the corporate form itself had been offered as the basis of a potential threat to the electoral process,
some measure of protection had attached to corporate political
speech. In 1986, while Austin was in the courts, the Supreme
Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 207. The Court distinguished the "careful legislative
adjustment of federal election laws" from Congress's first attempt to regulate corporate
and union political contributions and expenditures in 1907 through the various amendments to FECA. Id.at 209. See note 1 supra for this history. In Right to Work the Court
ignored the constitutionality of the umbrella provision in FECA that prohibited unions
and corporations from making contributions and expenditures, except from segregated
funds of PACs specifically established for political purposes. This provision was explored
more fully in Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, wherein the
Court actually did balance the purpose of the regulation with the associational rights of a
nonstock, nonmember corporation. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). See notes 87-99 and accompanying text infra.
" 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
'6 26 U.S.C. § 9001 (1988).
See Presidential Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f)(1) (1988) (making it a
criminal offense for independent "political committees" to expend more than $1,000 to
further the election of a major party presidential candidate who receives public

financing).
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 497.
Id. at 500.
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Court indicated that under some circumstances corporations
could freely engage in partisan speech.60 In general, the Court
had permitted limitations on contributions in the context of
candidate elections, disallowed expenditure limitations in the
same context, and permitted neither contribution nor expenditure restrictions in the context of referenda.
II.

AUSTIN V. M/fICHIGAN STATE CHAmER OF COAMMERCE

A.

Facts

The Michigan State Chamber of Commerce is a nonprofit
organization comprised of approximately 8000 members, seventy-five percent of whom are for-profit corporations.0 ' The
Chamber describes itself as "an ideological corporation formed
to promote- the common good and interests of the Michigan business community. '62 Among its purposes, its bylaws direct the
Chamber to promote conditions supportive of the economic
community, to collect and disseminate information regarding
laws of interest to the business community, to publicize the
views of the business community on such matters, to train and3
educate its members, and to foster ethical business practices.
The bylaws also authorize the Chamber to receive contributions
and'to make expenditures for political purposes, coordinate activities with similar organizations and perform any other lawful
political activity."
The Chamber pursued its active role in the political process
in various ways. It lobbied the Michigan legislature with respect
to assorted laws and regulations, advocated the passage or defeat
of ballot questions, and communicated with its membership concerning partisan political issues.65 In 1977 the Chamber estab60 See Federal Election Conm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 US. 238
(1986). See notes 87-99 and accompanying text infra.
"' Brief for Appellant at 12, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct.
1391 (1990) (No. 88-1569).
2

Brief for Appellee at 4, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. CL

1391 (1990) (No. 88-1569).

"Michigan

Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 643 F. Supp. 397, 398 (W.D. Mich.

1986).

" Michigan Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 856 F.2d 783, 784-85 (6th Cir. 1988).
5 Brief for Appellee at 4, Austin (No. 88-1569) ("It is important for the State
Chamber to be involved in electoral politics because elected officials make decisions in
the legislative and regulatory arenas directly affecting the business community.").

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57: 903

lished the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce Political Action Committee ("PAC").6" In 1985, however, when the Chamber
wanted to place an advertisement in the Grand Rapids Press endorsing a candidate in a state election, it sought to do so from its
general treasury funds.0 Since section 54 of the Michigan Campaign Act, which required corporations to use segregated funds
for political purposes, prohibited the Chamber from making this
expenditure from its general treasury, the Chamber filed an action for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, challenging
this prohibition as an infringement to free expression under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 8
66 Austin, 643 F. Supp. 397, 398 (W.D. Mich. 1986). Michigan Compiled Laws §
169.255(1) authorizes the Chamber to establish a segregated fund to be used for political
purposes, and provides:
A corporation or joint stock company formed under the laws of this or another
state or foreign country may make an expenditure for the establishment and
administration and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund
to be used for political purposes. A fund established under this section shall be
limited to making contributions to, and expenditures on behalf of candidate
committees, ballot question committees, political party committees, and independent committees.

MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 169.255(1) (Supp. 1989). These segregated funds are the only excep-

tion to the statute's general prohibition against corporate political expenditures. See
note 68 and accompanying text infra. See also note 70 infra for text of MICH. CoAIP.
LAWS § 169.255(3) (limiting sources from whom money may be solicited for contributions
to segregated fund).
67 Austin, 643 F. Supp. 397 at 398 n.1. The newspaper has a circulation of 140,000
copies and is the only major daily newspaper in the Grand Rapids metropolitan area. Id.
68 The Act prohibits corporations from making political expenditures, except from
segregated funds. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 169.254(1) provides:

Except with respect to the exceptions and conditions in subsections (2) and (3)
and [§ 169. 255], and to loans made in the ordinary course of business, a corporation may not make a contribution or expenditure or provide volunteer personal services which services are excluded from the definition of a contribution
pursuant to [§ 169.204(3)(a)].
Id. For text of § 169.255, see note 66 supra. Section 169.204(3)(a) provides that contributions do not refer to any of the following:
(a) Volunteer personal services provided without compensation, or payments of
costs incurred of less than $500.00 in a calendar year by an individual for personal travel expenses if the costs are voluntarily incurred without any understanding or agreement that the costs shall be, directly or indirectly, repaid.
Section 169.254(5) outlines the penalties for violation of these provisions:
A person who knowingly violates this section is guilty of a felony and shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $5,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than
three years, or both, and if the person is other than an individual, the person
shall be fined not more than $10,000.
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B. The Lower Court Decisions
The District Court of Western Michigan began its consideration of the case by reviewing the legislative history of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, finding that the 1976 Act had actually expanded the role of corporations in Michigan political
elections. 9 The 1976 Act added to the existing law the right of a
corporation to establish and fund the administration of separate
segregated funds from which to make expenditures in support of
political candidates. 70 Nonetheless, the 1976 Act retained the
prohibition of general treasury expenditures in connection with
candidate elections, the prohibition at issue here.7 1 Consequently the Chamber's position that the regulation resulted in a
burden on free expression forced a constitutional challenge. 2
"

Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 399-400. But see Amicus Curiae Brief of the Washington

Legal Foundation at 11-12, Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. C.
1397 (1990) (No. 88-1569) (arguing that previous laws regulated contributions,and the
1976 law regulated expenditures, as well).
70 Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 399-400, referring to MicmL Coup. LAWS § 169.255(1). See
note 66 supra for text of § 169.255(1). Note, however, that the sources from which contributions may be solicited and accepted are severely limited by § 169.255(3), which states:
Contributions for a fund established under this section by a corporation which
is nonprofit may be solicited from any of the following persons or their
spouses:
(a) Members of the corporation who are individuals.
(b) Stockholders of members of the corporation.
(c) Officers or directors of members of the corporation.
(d) Employees of the members of the corporation who have policy making,
managerial, professional, supervisory, or administrative nonclerical
responsibilities.
MDc Cohie. LAWS § 169.255. It is likely that this provision would be construed as narrowly as was its equivalent in federal law. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 204-07 (1985).
7!
hca CoMP. LAws § 169.254(1) (Supp. 1989). See note 68 supra for statutory text.
72 The Michigan Supreme Court interpreted art. I, §§ 2, 3 & 5 of the Michigan Constitution as coextensive with the protections in the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution. The court cited for authority Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 P.A. 227, 242 N.W.2d 3, 9-10, 14 (Mich. 1976).
As the Chamber's proposed advertisement was in support of a candidate and would
constitute an independent expenditure under the Act, made without coordination with
the candidate or his campaign, the court debated whether it was yet within the general
prohibition of "expenditures" in section 54(1). Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 400. The court
first considered the definition of expenditure under Mic. Comp. L,ws § 169.206(1),
which states:
"Expenditure" means a payment, donation, loan, pledge, or promise of payment of money or anything of ascertainable monetary value for goods, materials, services, or facilities in assistance of, or in opposition to, the nomination or
election of a candidate or the qualification, passage, or defeat of a ballot ques-
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1. First Amendment Challenge
The court preliminarily addressed the Chamber's First
Amendment challenge by reviewing the First Amendment protections. 3 It noted that while not every limitation on protected
speech was unconstitutional, any such restraint must be justified
by a compelling state interest. 74 Furthermore, to be a valid regulation, it must be narrowly tailored to that interest 75 Accordingly, the court directed its attention to these standards, ultimately concluding that the restraints of section 54 were not
contrary to the First Amendment.
Of the various interests advanced by Michigan,7 6 the state's
interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process was
deemed to constitute a compelling interest.7 7 The court noted

tion. An offer or tender of an expenditure is not an expenditure if expressly
and unconditionally rejected or returned.
The court then considered the definition of an independent expenditure, outlined in
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 169.209(1), as follows:
"Independent expenditure" means an expenditure as defined in [§ 169.206] by
a person if the expenditure is not made at the direction of, or under the control
of, another person and if the expenditure is not a contribution to a committee.
Reasoning that independent expenditures were a category of expenditures in general, the
court concluded that the Chamber's intended expenditure fell within the ambit of MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 169.254. Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 400. With that determination, the court
reached the Chamber's constitutional challenges.
11 Austin, 643 F. Supp at 401 (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
500-01 (1952)) (the First Amendment forbids states from enacting any law abridging the
freedom of speech); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) ("The first amendment affords the broadest protection
to such political expression in order 'to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' "); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)
(Political speech "does not lose its first amendment protection because money is spent to
project it.").
7' Austin, 643 F. Supp at 401 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980)).
' Id. at 402.
7 The three justifications advanced by the state were (1) to safeguard the electoral
process from corruption or the appearance of corruption resulting from large independent expenditures made in support of political candidates, (2) to protect minority shareholders who object to the use of corporate funds in support of a political candidate they
oppose, and (3) to make available to the public the sources of campaign finances since
expenditures would be funneled through Political Action Committees (PACs) which
must disclose such information. Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 402.
" Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 402 n.7. Although the court found that it did not need to
consider the remaining two justifications, having accepted the rationale of safeguarding
the electoral process, it did quote the Supreme Court as holding that "preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling interest thus
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that preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption
had long been established as "interests of the highest importance. 717 The court then examined section 54 to see whether it
was precisely tailored to these objectives.
In its discussion of the proscriptions of section 54, the court
emphasized that the prohibitions were placed on corporations
and did .not reach expenditures made by individuals. 9 Indeed
the court relied on this distinction between corporations and individuals: "The differing restrictions... reflect a judgment by
[the legislature] that these entities have differing structures and
purposes, and that therefore may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process."8 0 Moreover, the court reasoned that the limitation of section 54(1) did not amount to banning speech, particularly when
viewed in conjunction with section 55(1) and its authorization of
a segregated fund from which a corporation could make such expenditures."' The court concluded that section 54 was a valid
regulation under the First Amendment,
as it was precisely tai8 2
lored to a compelling state interest.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Challenge
Turning to the plaintiff's claims under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the district court rejected
the Chamber's claim that the regulation was invalid because it

far identified for restricting campaign finances." Id. at 402 n.7 (quoting Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985)).
78

Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 402 (quoting the discussion in First Nat'l Bank of Boston

v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978), which quoted United States v. International
Union United Auto., Aircraft and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 575
(1957)).
79Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 402-03. Apparently the court interpreted Buckley as

striking down expenditure limitations placed on individuals. The Buckley Court, however, invalidated expenditure ceilings because they interfered with protected expression,
and could not be justified by the government's interest in protecting the integrity of the
electoral process. The Court in Buckley did not strike down the expenditure provision on
overbreadth grounds, i.e., that the provision was unconstitutionally broad in reaching
expenditures made by individuals,as well as expenditures made by groups, associations,
etc. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-51.
80 Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 403-04 (quoting California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981)).
81 Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 404. For text of Mic.
66 supra.
82 Id.

CoitP. LAWS § 169.255(1), see note
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failed to regulate the political spending of unions along with its
regulation of corporations."3 The court maintained that the
"unique threat of corporate power to the electoral process," was
sufficient justification for the statute to distinguish between corporate and noncorporate entities.8 4 Likewise, the court dispensed with the Chamber's other equal protection challengethe prohibition impermissibly distinguished between corporations involved in media and corporations that were not."5 Thus
the district court upheld section 54 of the Michigan Campaign
Finance Act, deciding that while it burdened plaintiff's freedom
of speech, it was narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state
interest, and made no impermissible distinctions between the
Chamber and other persons.
3.

The Significance of Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals" reversed the district
court's decision in Austin, attributing its holding to the intervening Supreme Court decision in FederalElection Commission
v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life.8 7 In Massachusetts Citizens
the Supreme Court examined a federal provision of the Federal

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, in pertinent part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
84 Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 405. The Chamber's choice of unions as an example of the
underinclusiveness of the statute may reflect the fact that unions in Michigan, America's
car manufacturing capital, represent a significant interest.
85 Id. The court argued that any corporation could avail itself of the media exemption to section 54(1) as the statute did not refer to one's status as a media corporation,
per se. Presumably the activity was granted the exemption from the statute, not the
organization itself. The court stated that the language of the statute did not refer to
either media corporations or corporations, alluding to MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.206(3)(d),
which excludes from the definition of expenditure:
An expenditure by a broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical or publication for any news story, commentary, or editorial in support of
or opposition to a candidate for elective office, or a ballot question in the regular course of publication or broadcasting.
88 Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1988).
87 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
83
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Election Campaign Act (FECA), 8 similar to section 54 of Michigan's Act, and its effect on an ideological corporation."9 The
Court concluded that under the First Amendment, Massachusetts Citizens for Life, (MCFL) could not be required to establish
and administer a segregated fund from which to make its political expenditures. The Court balanced the burden placed on
MCFL by such a requirement with the proferred government interest of preventing corruption, and concluded that the state's
interest was not sufficiently compelling with respect to MCFL to
permit any infringement on First Amendment freedom. 0
The Court characterized MCFL as a corporation formed for
ideological purposes, "a voluntary political association," which
did not "suddenly present the specter of corruption merely by
assuming the corporate form."91 The Court identified the three
features of MCFL upon which it based its holding.9 2 The Sixth
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) provides, in pertinent part(a) It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political office, or caucus held to select candidates for any
political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which
presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or
a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in
connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to
select candidates for any of the foregoing offices ....
2 U.S.C. § 441b (1985).
11 Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 262-63. MCFL was incorporated as a nonprofit, nonstock corporation. The purpose of MCFL, as stated in its articles of incorporation was: "To foster respect for human life and to defend the right [of the] unborn,
through educational, political and other forms of activities and in addition to engage in
any other lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized... ...
" Id. at
241-42.
90 Id. at 263.
91 Id. at 262-63.
92 Id. at 264. The three features by which the Court determined that MCFL could
not constitutionally be restricted in its spending have become the standard by which
other corporations seek similar exemptions:
First, it was formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and
cannot engage in business activities.. ..This ensures that political resource3
reflect political support. Second, it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons
connected with the organization will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity. Third, MCFL was not
established by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not
to accept contributions from such entities. This prevents such corporations
from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to
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Circuit in Austin compared the Chamber to MCFL to determine
whether the Chamber was enough like MCFL to warrant an exception to the Michigan statute. 3
The first feature of an ideological corporation identified by
the Court in Massachusetts Citizens as distinguishing it from
ordinary business corporations was that MCFL "was formed for
the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities.

'94

The Austin court of appeals recog-

nized that this was not precisely true of the Chamber, but emphasized that the Chamber, like MCFL, was organized to
disseminate ideas, and not to amass wealth.95 It pointed out that
the Chamber, like MCFL, had a membership based on "popularity in the political marketplace." 8 The court of appeals
surmised that with regard to the first feature, the Chamber re97
sembled MCFL.

The second essential feature of MCFL, noted by the Court,
was that the organization "has no shareholders or other persons
affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings."9 8 The
Court found it important that no one had an -economic stake in
MCFL because this assured that continued association with
MCFL was based on support for the organization's political
agenda.9 The Austin court of appeals found this was true of the
Chamber as well. The court presumed that there was a correlation between the candidates advocated by the Chamber and
those supported by its members. In this respect the court found
the Chamber was more similar to MCFL than a traditional cor'
poration, where identity of political positions was less likely.
Regarding the third feature of MCFL, the Supreme Court
emphasized that MCFL was not established by a business corporation or a labor union. 10 1 Indeed MCFL did not accept contributions from either. The Court found that this policy prevented

the political marketplace.

Id.
93Austin, 856 F.2d at 789-90.

, Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 264.
Austin, 856 F.2d at 789.
Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 259.
Austin, 856 F.2d at 789.
9'Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 264.
Id.
Austin, 856 F.2d at 789.
Ill Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 259.
"
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MCFL and nonprofit corporations with similar policies "from
serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a
threat to the marketplace."10 2 The Austin court of appeals noted
that this statement could not strictly be said of the Chamber,
yet it nonetheless determined that "the reporting obligations of
[Michigan's Act] preclude, as a practical matter, the prospect of
'faceless' Chamber corporate members using the Chamber as a
conduit through which massive undisclosed contributions are
funneled for political purposes."'1 3 Accordingly, the court of appeals found that the Chamber would not be used by business
corporations as a way to circumvent their limitations on corporate political advocacy.

Concluding that the Chamber was sufficiently like MCFL,
the Sixth Circuit held that Michigan's expenditure restriction
could not be applied to the Chamber. Consequently, the court
did not consider the Chamber's arguments that section 54(1)
was imprecisely drawn, or that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 0
C.

The Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court, reversing the Sixth Circuit, upheld the
constitutionality of the Michigan Campaign Act, even as applied
to the nonprofit Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.10 5 The
102

Id.

at 264.

Austin, 856 F.2d at 789-90 (referring to Mica. Comup. LAws § 169.251).
A person, other than a committee, who makes an independent expenditure,
advocating the election of a candidate or the defeat of a candidate's opponents
or the qualification, passage, or defeat of a ballot question, in an amount of
$100.01 or more in a calendar year shall file a report of the independent expenditure, within 10 days, with the clerk of the county of residence of that person.
The report shall be made on an independent expenditure report form provided
by the secretary of state and shall include the date of the expenditure, a brief
description of the nature of the expenditure, the amount, the name and address of the person to whom it was paid, the name and address of the person
filing the report, together with the name, address, occupation, employer, and
principal place of business of each person who contributed $100.01 or more to
the expenditure. The filing official receiving the report shall forward copies, as
required, to the appropriate filing officers as described in [§ 169.236].
?Mcnm CoMp. LAWS § 169.251.
'°'

104 Austin, 856 F.2d at 790.

"05 Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). Justice
Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun and Stevens joined. Justices Brennan and Stevens filed
concurring opinions. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Kennedy,
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Court found that while the Act burdened the Chamber's "expressive activity," its requirements did not stifle corporate
speech.10 Moreover, section 54 was supported by a compelling
state interest in preventing corruption in the electoral process.
1. The Majority Decision
The Court focused on Michigan's interest in specifically regulating corporate political expenditures. Michigan argued that
the state granted special advantages to corporations-perpetual
life, limited liability and special tax treatment-for strictly economic purposes. 0 7 Without regulation, Michigan feared, corporations would use "resources amassed in the economic marketplace [to obtain] an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace."108 The Court determined that Michigan had a
compelling interest in avoiding this sort of corruption or the appearance of such corruption of the electoral process. 10 9
The Court cited Buckley for its holding that avoiding corruption or the appearance of corruption was a compelling state
interest. 1 0 In the context of unregulated campaign contributions, the Buckley Court had acknowledged that large corporate
donations might be offered in exchange for a prospective office
holder's political debt."' Michigan's expenditure regulation,
however, was not aimed at curbing the dangers of what it called
"political quid pro quo.""' 2 Rather, the Court found Michigan's
with which Justices Scalia and O'Connor joined.
'" Id. at 1397. The Court discussed the requirements of a segregated fund in this
context, referring to MICH. Comp. LAWS § 169.221 calling for a treasurer; MICH. CoMP.
LAWS § 169.224 requiring that the fund's administrators keep detailed accounts of contributions, and file a statement of organization with state officials; MICH. CoMP. LAWS §
169.255 limiting the sources from whom a fund may solicit contributions. For text of §
169.255, see notes 66 & 70 supra.
207 Appellant's Brief at 32, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct.
1391 (1990) (No. 88-1569).
108 Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397 (quoting Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 257).
'o' Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
11o Id. at 1397.
Ill Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1976). Note that in the same decision, the
Court refused to find that preventing such corruption in the context of expenditures
constituted a compelling state interest. Id. at 47.
"' See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (using the term "financial quid pro quo"). See also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (use of "quid pro quo"); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (use of
"political quid pro quo").
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regulation was directed toward, "a different type of corruption
in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and have little or no correlation to
113
the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."
Recognizing Michigan's interest as compelling, the Court
next examined whether the Act was narrowly tailored to avoid
corruption, ultimately concluding that it was precisely targeted
to Michigan's goal. The Court found that the potential for corruption which Michigan sought to eliminate was related to the
corporate form itself: the economic advantages of incorporation-limited liability, perpetual life, etc.-themselves provided
the potential for abuse of the electoral process. 4 The Court felt
that the state granted corporations these advantages to facilitate
economic success. However, when corporate resources, which
were facilitated by state conferred advantages, were put to political use, it amounted to a distortion of the electoral process. Because all corporations enjoyed these advantages, the Court dismissed the Chamber's argument that section 54(1) was
overinclusive because it extended to all corporations, regardless
of size or accumulated wealth.11 5 Similarly, the Court denied the
Chamber's contention that the statute was not narrowly tailored
because it applied to nonprofit as well as to for-profit corporations.' Rather than comparing for-profit and nonprofit corporations, the Court used the three features identified in Massachusetts Citizens to test whether a corporation posed the threat
11 7
that Michigan's Act sought to eliminate.
The Court then examined the Chamber for the three features by which an organization more closely resembles a voluntary political association than a business corporation. It is here
that the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit. Where the
court of appeals found similarities between the Chamber and

','

Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.

114

Id. at 1397-98.

"15 Id. at 1398. Note that the Court made this argument in its discussions of the
narrow tailoring requirement and the Fourteenth Amendment claim. Id. at 1401.
"a Id. at 1398-1400.
1,7 Id.
at 1398-99. Without stating as much, the Court presumed that not all nonprofit corporations shared MCFL's features which were "more akin to voluntary associations than business firms, and therefore should not have to bear burdens on independent

spending solely because of their incorporated status." Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S.
at 263. See note 92 supra for the three distinguishing features of MCFL.
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MCFL, the Supreme Court found critical differences between
them. 18 On each of the three critical features of MCFL, the
Court found enough difference to remove the Chamber from the
Massachusetts Citizens exception." 9
With regard to the first distinguishing feature of MCFL, the
Court contrasted its single political purpose to the varied purposes of the Chamber, many of which were "politically neutral."12 While the Chamber focused on providing services to its
members, MCFL activities were all "designed to further its [political] agenda.' ' 21 The second feature of MCFL noted by the
Court was the absence of "shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings."'

22

The im-

portance of this feature is that it ensures that no one suffers an
"economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree
with its political activity.' 23 The Court found that members of
the Chamber, in contrast to MCFL members, might choose to
remain members, notwithstanding political differences, merely
to enjoy the nonpolitical benefits of membership. 124 For this reason, the Court determined that members of the Chamber had
more in common with shareholders of a business corporation
2
than members of MCFL.1 5

18 See notes 86-104 and accompanying text supra for Sixth Circuit analysis of
Chamber's resemblance to MCFL.
"l See notes 120-32 and accompanying text infra.
120 Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1399 (quoting testimony from the Chamber's President and
Chief Executive Officer that one of the corporation's main purposes is to provide "service
to [its] membership that includes everything from group insurance to educational seminars, and. . litigation activities on behalf of the business community." Deposition of E.
James Barrett, Nov. 12, 1985, at 11).
122 Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1399 (quoting Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 242).
The Court was not entirely clear whether the multi-purposed nature of the Chamber
served to make the legislature's concern about corruption more viable than it had been
with respect to Massachusetts Citizens, or whether the Chamber's varied purposes delimited the protection afforded by its associational rights. See note 47 supra, explaining
the limited sphere in which the right of association operates.
122 Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 264.

123 Id.

Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1399.
Id. This observation talks to both the compelling nature of the state's interest
and the limits of the Chamber's associational rights. The notion that the money available
for political use should reflect only such money collected for political purposes is contravened when there is only one treasury for both political and nonpolitical uses, Alternatively, the fact that different people have different reasons for belonging to the Chamber
diminishes the argument that the organization is merely "an amplification" of the individuals' political voices. Presumably, it is in this context that Justice Brennan urged the
124

1
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Finally, the Court distinguished the Chamber for its dependence on business corporations for contributions. Whereas
MCFL had a policy of refusing money from business corporations, more than three quarters of the Chamber's members were
business corporations. 126 The Court warned that business corpo-

rations, their own contributions regulated by the state, might
funnel money into the Chamber's general treasury as a way to
circumvent the Act's effect on them.127 The Court reasoned that
payments to the Chamber would not be considered political expenditures or contributions, as they would not be given to influence an election. Business corporations could therefore give unregulated amounts of money to the Chamber, which, were the
Chamber excepted from the Act's expenditure requirement,
could use the money so collected for political purposes. The
Court thus justified applying the regulation to the Chamber, lest
it would be used as "a conduit for corporate political spend2 On this rationale, the Court determined that the expening."""
diture restriction was not overinclusive for restricting nonprofit
corporations as well as for-profit corporations. 29
In addition, the Court found two reasons that section 54
was not underinclusive for not restricting unincorporated labor
unions. First, the State's interest in regulating corporations was
founded on the special advantages afforded the corporate form,
not on the potential to accumulate wealth.130 Second, the Court
noted that a union member cannot be compelled to contribute
to the union's political activities. Union member dues, where required, may only be used toward collective bargaining activities,
and the like.'3 1 This policy ensures that the funds available for

Court to consider the rights of the minority shareholder. See notes 13641 and accompanying text infra.
128

Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1400.

The Court noted that while a nonprofit corporation may receive contributions
into its general treasury, under the Act, a nonprofit corporation could not receive contributions from corporations into its segregated fund. Id. at 1400 n.3 (referring to MIc,.
CoM. LAws § 169.255(3). See note 70 supra for statutory text). The issue, therefore,
became whether the "conduit theory" was sufficient justification to relegate nonprofit
political advocacy to segregated funds, as well.
128 Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1400 (quoting Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 264).
129 Id.
12

120

Id. at 1398.

, Id. at 1400-01 (citing Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 US. 735
(1988)) (Nonunion members of bargaining unit, while compelled to contribute to collective bargaining, may not be compelled to contribute to other union activities.); Abood v.
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union political activities accurately'reflect support for union positions. Accordingly, the compelling interest in regulating the
"corrosive effect" of corporate wealth was already satisfied by
13 2
dues-spending limitations where union wealth was concerned.
Having found that section 54 did not infringe on the Chamber's First Amendment rights, the Court turned to the Chamber's claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and dismissed
these as well. Even under strict scrutiny, the Court justified the
State's decision to regulate on the basis of corporate form, as it
recognized a compelling state interest in "eliminating from the
political process the corrosive effect of political 'war chests'
amassed with 33 the aid of the legal advantages given to
1
corporations."
Additionally the Court was satisfied that the Act's exemption for media corporations was constitutionally permissible.3 4
Remarking on the unique societal role of the media, the Court
justified removing media corporations from the Act in order to
ensure that media corporations were free to report or comment
on new~worthy events, including state elections. 36 The Court
thus accepted Michigan's showing of a danger to the electoral
process as well as its chosen means to curb the danger, and upheld section 54 and the requirement that corporate political expenditures be made only through segregated funds or PACs.
2. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Brennan, the author of the Massachuetts Citizens
decision, wrote a separate opinion to clarify his views. He emphasized that the prohibitions of section 54 did not amount to a
total foreclosure of corporate political speech, but merely required that candidate advocacy be funded from a Political Action Committee (PAC) or segregated fund.1 36 Justice Brennan
argued that there were two tiers of "minority shareholders" protected by applying the Act to the Chamber: small businesses

Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (Nonunion employees may not be compelled to

contribute to union's political activities.).
132 Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1401.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1402.
136 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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that joined the Chamber for nonpolitical advantages, and minority shareholders of member corporations who may have opposed
political use of the corporation's money.1 37 He believed that "the
State surely has a compelling interest in preventing a corporation it has chartered from exploiting those who do not wish to
contribute to the Chamber's political message."1 38 While Justice
Brennan conceded that the law was underinclusive,139 as it did
not ban other types of political expression to which a member
might object, 140 he justified this underinclusive approach as
Michigan's attempt to address the particularly "sensitive" arena
of elections.

141

Justice Steven's concurring opinion argued that the distinction between contributions and expenditures should be abandoned in the analysis of corporate participation in candidate
elections.' 42 He found a sufficiently important state interest in
avoiding either the fact or the appearance of corruption to justify regulating both contributions and expenditures. 43
3. The Dissents
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing critique of the majority's and
Justice Brennan's opinions. Attacking with both case law and
public policy, he dubbed the holding an "Orwellian announcement.1 144 Justice Scalia agreed neither that section 54 reflected a
compelling state interest nor that it was narrowly drawn. "' ,
Id. at 1404-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
138

Id. at 1406 (Brennan, J., concurring).

Perhaps Justice Brennan did not see this as a fatal flaw because of the "one step
at a time" rationale behind much regulatory legislation. Under this approach, a legislature may address that part of a problem that strikes it as most acute, later to return to
other aspects of the problem. The justification for this latitude assumes that a legislature
can not feasibly consider every aspect of a policy in a systematic and complete way,
particularly as legislation often arises in response to a specific event. Even when a systematic approach is feasible, the legislature may choose to proceed experimentally and
cautiously. See Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 209, which refers to the "cautious advance,
step by step" approach recognized in National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1937).
110 Austin, 110 S.Ct. at 1406 (Brennan, J., concurring) (Chamber not restricted in
expenditures relative to lobbying or issue advocacy, for example).
139

144

Id. at 1407 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 1407 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

1

Id. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

1I
141
143
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Justice Scalia argued that in recognizing Michigan's interest
as compelling, the Court abandoned the Buckley distinction be-

tween the threats posed by contributions and those by expenditures. 14 6 Buckley specifically found that independent expenditures, unlike contributions, did not raise a sufficient threat of
quid pro quo corruption to justify restriction. 147 According to
Justice Scalia, rather than defend its position, the Austin majority simply announced that Buckley and Austin were concerned
with different evils which each Court referred to as corruption.1 48 Justice Scalia referred to the corruption fashioned by the
majority as the "New Corruption," cautioning that it too easily
lends itself to abuse: "anything the Court deems politically undesirable can be turned into political corruption-by simply
describing its effects as politically 'corrosive.' ",149
More troublesome for Justice Scalia than the Court's finding of a compelling state interest was the Court's application of

the narrow tailoring requirement. He argued that if a restriction
was designed to counter the effect of great corporate "war
chests," then it should have been directed to corporations with
great "war chests."' 50 Justice Scalia concluded that section 54

Id. at 1410 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45). More interesting in
this regard is Justice Scalia's observation that the federal law struck in Buckley was a
lesser restriction than Michigan's prohibition, which was upheld by the Austin majority.
Id.
148 Id. at 1410-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to majority opinion, id. at 1397).
Justice Scalia argued that:
The Court does not try to defend the proposition that independent advocacy
poses a substantial risk of political 'corruption,' as English-speakers understand that term. Rather, it asserts that that concept (which the [majority] defines as "'financial quid pro quo" corruption,'. . .) is really just a narrow subspecies of a hitherto unrecognized genus of political corruption. 'Michigan's
regulation,' we are told, 'aims at a different type of corruption in the political
arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little
or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.'
Id. at 1410-11.
"4' Id. at 1411 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One of Justice Scalia's criticisms of the New
Corruption was that it rested upon the "shaky proposition" that government may ensure
that expenditures "'reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations.'" Id. (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 1397) (emphasis added in dissent).
Justice Scalia surmised that the majority's requirement of public support for corporate
expenditures was based on an irrational distinction between "too much speech" by an
individual billionaire and "too much speech" by a corporation. Id. at 1411.
1
Id. at 1413. Justice Scalia cited Buckley as having considered and rejected "the
146
14
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was not precisely drawn because it restricted speech on the basis
of the "mere potential for producing social harm," the possibility that corporate expenditures "distort" the electoral process.0 1
Justice Scalia contended that expenditures should not be restricted as a prophylactic measure, and condemned the majority's approach as incompatible with the First Amendment'0 2 and
as a "departure from long accepted premises of our political
53
system."M
Justice Kennedy's dissent accused the Court's holding of
validating two schemes of censorship.'" First, section 54 restricted speech based on content-the subject of candidate elections. Second, section 54 discriminated on the basis of the
speaker's identity-some nonprofit corporations will fall into the
MCFL exception, while other nonprofit corporations will not.0 0

Justice Kennedy charged that it is improper for a legislature to
determine either what subjects may be addressed or who may
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others. . . ." For Justice Scalia, this "one man, one
minute" principle of free speech could not justify the Court's finding of a compelling
interest. Id. at 1411. Nor was Justice Scalia persuaded by Justice Brennan that protecting the rights of minority shareholders within a corporation constituted a compelling
state interest. Id. at 1411-12.
15, Id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
49-51 (1919) for Justice Holmes's "clear and present danger" test).
152Id. at 1416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The premise of our system is that there is no
such thing as too much speech.").
Despite all the talk about 'corruption and the appearance of corruption'-evils
which are not significantly implicated and that can be avoided in many other
ways-it is entirely obvious that the object of law [the Court has approved] is
not to prevent wrongdoing but to prevent speech. Since those private associations known as corporations have so much money, they will speak so much
more, and their views will be given inordinate prominence in election campaigns. This is not an argument that our democratic traditions allow-neither
with respect to individuals associated in corporations nor with respect to other
categories of individuals whose speech may be 'unduly' extensive (because they
are rich) or 'unduly' persuasive (because they are movie stars) or 'unduly'
respected (because they are clergyman).

Id.

153 Id. at 1415 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (The Court's decision departed from traditionally benevolent management of arena of public debate). See Justice Scalias discussion of
Madison, Jefferson, and Tocqueville. Id. at 1415-16.
Id. at 1416 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1418-19 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) Only small, single issue nonprofit corporations pass the Court's test as "favored participants" in the electoral process. d. at
1419.
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address them. 158

The flaw in the Court's analysis, according to Justice Kennedy, was that it adopted the reasoning behind restricting cam17
paign contributions and imposed it on campaign expenditures.
To Justice Kennedy, this amounted to abandoning the distinction. He noted that while "the compelling governmental interest
in preventing corruption supported the restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate form
with regard to candidate campaign contributions, a similar find' 8
ing could not be supported for independent expenditures."'
Because he rejected the notion that what was a compelling rationale for regulating contributions was sufficiently compelling
to justify regulating expenditures, he did not accept the majority
view that "combatting the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth," amounted to a compelling interest here.159 Nor was Justice Kennedy persuaded that
"equaliz[ing] the relative influence of speakers," by limiting corporate expression, constituted a proper and valid interest., 0
Justice Kennedy would have stricken the Act because it was
not narrowly tailored, and he pointed to Massachusetts Citizens
as authority that mere incorporation does not "present the specter of corruption.''

6

the Act based
corporations.' 62

on

III.

Alternatively, he would have invalidated

its

blanket

exemption

for

media

ANALYSIS

Austin held that it is constitutionally permissible for a state
to prohibit a corporation from using general treasury funds for
expenditures made in connection with state elections. The Court
ruled that a state has a compelling interest in avoiding the "cor15 Id. at 1418 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (" 'In the realm of protected speech, the
legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which per.
sons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue.' ") (quoting First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978)).
"I Id. at 1420 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
158

Id. at 1421 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Conservative Political Action

Comm., 470 U.S. at 500-01) (emphasis added).

Id. at 1420 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion, id. at 1397).
"o

at 263).

Id. at 1421 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1425 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S.

1"2 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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rosive and distorting effects" of great corporate wealth that is
accumulated with the help of the state-conferred corporate
structure but has "little or no correlation to the public's support
for the corporation's political ideas." 16 3 In accepting this as a
compelling interest, Austin purported to reaffirm the proposition that preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption "are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances. ' " Yet,
strictly speaking, Austin did not reaffirm that proposition. By
broadening the definition of corruption, Austin deviated from
Buckley; Austin simultaneously recognized a more generalized
compelling interest and enlarged the confines of permissible legislative intervention in the electoral process.
A. A Problem of Definition
In Austin the Court conceded that the state of Michigan's
understanding of corruption of the electoral process was somewhat different from that recognized in Buckley." 5 Austin justified Michigan's version by explaining that the Buckley definition
was geared to only one particular evil, whereas Michigan sought
to deter a greater corruption. 6 What the Austin Court failed to
acknowledge, however, was how crucial Buckley's narrow definition was in election finance case law.
1.

The Buckley Definition of Corruption and CorruptionPrevention

Buckley's conception of corruption involved the threat that
large financial contributions might have a coercive influence on a
candidate's platform, and if elected, on the official's agenda: "To

"'

Id. at 1397.

164 Id.

(quoting Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 496-97, which in

turn cited Buckl~y for the holding). See note 165 infra.
161Id. at 1397. The majority stated:

Regardless of whether this danger of "financial quid pro quo" corruption...
may be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent expenditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena:
the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.
168 Id.
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the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political
quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.' 167 It was to defend against this form of abuse that the
Buckley Court recognized as compelling the government's interest in corruption-prevention. This narrow construction of corruption was critical, not only to the holding in Buckley, but to
subsequent election finance case law as well.
A narrow view of corruption, as the functional equivalent of
bribery, was the basis on which the Buckley Court distinguished
between the regulation of contributions and the regulation of expenditures. Because the Court determined that the threat of
quid pro quo corruption was substantial with respect to unregulated contributions, but insignificant with respect to unregulated
expenditures, the Court upheld only the restrictions on contributions.1 8 Further, the Buckley Court did not even consider the
regulation of expenditures as a means of preventing the perception of corruption. 6 9 Presumably the interest in regulating expenditures in order to prevent the appearance of corruption
would not have been deemed compelling because the Buckley
Court had already determined that expenditures provided no
70
opportunity for actual corruption.
Buckley's conception of corruption explains election finance
case law up to Massachusetts Citizens in 1986. In general, the

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
Id. at 47-48.
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little
assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with
the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to
the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as
a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.
Id. at 47.
's

"9 The Buckley Court stated that the interest in avoiding the appearance of corruption was "of almost equal concern" with avoiding the actuality of corruption. Id. at 27.
The Court continued, however, by tracing the appearance of corruption to "public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual finan-

cial contributions." Id. (emphasis added). Arguably, the Court felt that there must be
the actual opportunity for corruption for there to be the appearance of corruption. Perhaps this explains why the Court discussed the avoidance of an appearance of corruption
only in the context of contributions, where the Court had found the opportunity for
corruption, and not in connection with expenditures, where the Court had concluded
there was not the same opportunity.
"' See notes 168-69 supra.
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Court upheld restrictions on contributions1 7 and struck restrictions on expenditures."7 2 But the Court's inquiry in election finance cases had not been limited to the simple question of
whether it was a contribution or expenditure at issue; rather the
primary focus in each case was whether there had been the opportunity for political quid pro quo, the exchange of money for
political debt. That emphasis explains why even contribution
limits were struck in the context of referenda: there was simply
no opportunity for this brand of impropriety.7 3
Buckley's use of a narrow definition of corruption was deliberate. It was the Court's attempt to balance legitimate regulation with legitimate participation in the electoral process. The
definition had worked a bright line between permissible and impermissible legislative motives; in particular, Buckley sought to
facilitate the elimination of political quid pro quo. On the other
hand, the Court unequivocally refused to permit a legislative attempt to "equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the
outcome of elections."'7 4 Buckley's definition confined the legislature to regulating against an improper influence of money on a
candidate or officeholder; it did not permit the legislature its
concern about the influence of money on the outcome of elections. The Court rejected "as wholly foreign to the First Amendment" the notion that "government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others."' 7 5 The Court reasoned that First Amendment

'71 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, (1976); Federal Election Comm'n v. Na-

tional Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (upholding restriction on solicitation of
contributions). See also California Medical Ass'n. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 Us.
182 (1981) (upholding limitation on contributions to "multi-candidate political
committee").
172 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (striking statute restricting PAC expenditures).
,'3 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) ('The risk of
corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections ... simply is not present in
popular vote on a public issue."). See also Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of

Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (striking an ordinance on contributions to committees

formed to support or oppose ballot measures).
174 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. The Court patently dismissed the government's
proferred interest in restricting the access of wealthier speakers to enhance the relative
voice of poorer ones. Id. Accordingly, the Court refused to uphold expenditure regulations on this basis.
175

Id. at 49-50.
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protection "against governmental abridgment of free expression
can not properly be made to depend on a person's financial abil1 76
ity to engage in public discussion.'
Buckley's view of corruption underscores the different interests behind regulating against the exchange of money for political favors and regulating to equalize the relative voices of participants in the electoral process. The narrow view of corruption
clarifies legislative intent insofar as it begs the question of
whether a regulatory scheme is aimed at the relationship between a contributor and a candidate or the relationship between
a financier and impact at the polls. By defining corruption to
include only illicit political deal making, Buckley confined legislative intervention in the electoral process; it constrained the
legislature from effecting its vision of a more egalitarian electoral process at the expense of constitutionally protected
expression.
2.

Austin's "Corrosive and Distorting Effects" Model

Under Austin's more expansive definition of corruption it is
more difficult to distinguish a legislature's attempt to purge corruption from its attempt to equalize influence. Once the specter
of corruption extends beyond the parameters of the relationship
between the financier and the candidate, remedial regulation af-

171 Id. at 49. The Buckley Court found no support to regulate on financial ability
from the equal access rationale that had supported the Federal Communications Com-

mission's "fairness doctrine." Id.at 49 n.55. The FCC policy in question required broadcast licensees to devote some programming to public issues and to present both sides of
any public issue. The Court noted that the limited number of broadcast frequencies imposed unique First Amendment problems. Id. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,

395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the political-editorial and personal-attack portions of the
doctrine). The Buckley Court refused to extend the equal access rationale to the electoral process in general, contrasting the "undeniable effect of [FECA's expenditure restriction with] the presumed effect of the fairness doctrine [which was] one of 'enhancing the
volume and coverage' of public issues." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 n.55 (quoting Red Lion,
395 U.S. at 388). Subsequently, the FCC abandoned this doctrine, having determined

that the doctrine was not having its intended effect. See Robert D. Hershey, F.C.C.
Votes Down Fairness Doctrine in a 4-0 Decision, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987. at § Al.
Nor did the Court in Buckley find support in the voting rights cases. Buckley, 424

U.S. at 49 (citing Eastern RR Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S. 127, 139
(1961)) ("A construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taking a
public position on matters in which they are financially interested would. . . deprive the
people of their right to petition in the very instances in which that right may be of the
most importance to them.").
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fects the electoral process as a whole. Within this enlarged
framework, legislative intent may more easily expand from the
eradication of a particular evil, to the eradication of a larger
class of evils, and even to the effectuation of some model of a
greater good.
The Austin Court admitted that Michigan's interest had a
broader focus than that which was upheld in Buckley and its
progeny. 1 " Nonetheless, the Austin Court insisted that restricting the source of corporate expenditures to segregated funds or
PACs was not an attempt to "equalize the relative influence of
speakers on elections."1 78 Nothing in the opinion, however, clarified how Michigan's regulation, which was aimed at defeating
corporate wealth's "corrosive" influence on elections, was any
different from a general attempt to equalize speakers' influence
on elections. Insofar as the evil recognized in Austin was the
"unfair advantage" enjoyed by corporations in influencing election results, Michigan's remedy was to strip corporations of their
unfair advantage, in effect, combatting corporate domination of
elections by limiting corporate participation in the process. In
this light, Michigan's regulation closely resembles an attempt to
equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections.
While admittedly substituting broader concerns for those
supporting Buckley, Justice Marshall offered thin explanation
for Austin's abandoning the traditional definition of corruption,
nor much justification for adopting its own conception of corruption. In fact the whole of Austin's own original discussion consisted of three remarks, all of which appear to be result-oriented.
In Justice Marshall's first attempt to defend Michigan's interest, he asserted that it was not the wealth of corporations but
the "state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the
amassing of large treasuries [which] warrants the limit on independent expenditures. 179 Justice Marshall reasoned that the
state afforded corporations various attributes which enhance
their ability to attract capital and deploy resources, that these
advantages were intended to facilitate success in an economic
sphere, and that corporate resources amassed by virtue of these
state conferred advantages constituted an "unfair advantage"
"' Austin, 110 S. Ct. at

Id. 1397-98.
178 Id. at 1398.
178

1397. See note 165 supra.
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when used for political purposes. However, this contradicts constitutional tradition. As Justice Scalia asserted in his dissent, "It
is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those
1 8s
special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights."
That the state giveth and therefore may taketh away is a particularly troublesome argument in the realm of protected rights.'8 1
Nor can Michigan's statute be justified as a simple business regulation,182 since even the majority in Austin acknowledged
that
18 3
the restriction constituted at least a burden on speech.
Justice Marshall's second argument was that expenditures
should be regulated, because even as expenditures, "[c]orporate
wealth can unfairly influence elections."'1 84 Apparently Justice
Marshall's fear was neither that corporate wealth would be used
to influence candidates unfairly nor that corporations would
benefit unfairly from such expenditures. It was not the prospect
that "[e]lected officials . . . [would be] influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office" that worried Justice Marshall.18 5 Rather the Court's concern was that, without regulation,
corporate speech would have undue influence on the outcome of

180Id. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181 See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
364 (1984) (invalidating a ban on editorializing by noncommercial stations that receive
federal funds because subsidy could not justify total ban); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593 (1972) (denial of employment to teacher on the basis of individual's speech is uncon-

stitutional); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (property tax exemption cannot be
conditioned on an individual's views and expressions); Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563 (1968) (teacher may not be compelled to relinquish First Amendment right
to comment on matters of public interest).
82 See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of
Appellee at 19 n.13, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990)
(No. 88-1569) ("This is a free speech case, not an economic substantive due process case.
Business interests are not seeking to avoid government regulation of their businesses;
they are resisting government censorship of their speech.").
1" Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396 ("requiring corporations to make independent political
expenditures only through special segregated funds . . burdens corporate freedom of
expression") (citing Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 252). Arguably, the statute totally bans corporate speech insofar as it prohibits a corporation from speaking as a corporation. See Brief of Amici Curiae, Washington Legal Foundation et al. at 15-16, Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990) (No. 88-1569) (arguing that
political speech from a corporation's PAC is not the same as speech from the corporation
itself, and that the Chamber's speech would be more credible than that from its associated PAC).
184 Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.

This was the definition utilized by the Court in Conservative PoliticalAction
Comm., 470 U.S. at 497.
188
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an election.

Third, Justice Marshall argued that Michigan's regulation

"ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the
political ideas espoused by corporations."'188 Notably, the Court
required public support, and not shareholder support, for the
expression of corporate political ideas.' 7T Presumably, even with

100 percent shareholder approval, corporate political speech, if
made without public support, is itself a corruption of the election process."' Yet Michigan's regulatory scheme specifically
prohibits a corporation from acquiring public support, particu-

larly in financial terms. 89 The Act required a corporation to
speak through its PAC or segregated fund, yet it severely limited
the sources from which money could be solicited. 8 0 In this way

the Michigan Act effectively denies a corporation the opportunity to achieve financial public support. Perhaps the majority
186 Austin, 110 S. CL at 1398. The distinction the Court found between the Chamber and MCFL was based in large part on the fact that MCFL's funds were a reflection
of the popularity of its ideas in the political marketplace, that MCFL's political expenditures reflected public support. Id. at 1399-1400. See notes 118-29 and accompanying text
infra. The Court found an important difference between the Chamber and MCFL in that
the Chamber accepted corporate contributions into its treasury. Id. at 1400. Justice Kennedy's problem with this position was that "this distinction rests on the fallacy that the
source of the speaker's funds is somehow relevant to the speaker's right of expression or
society's interest in hearing what the speaker has to say." Id. at 1422 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
1" Perhaps the Court meant shareholder support when it referred to public support. This would be consistent with one of the features identified in Massachusetts Citizens, that a minority member should not face economic consequences by choosing to
disas3ociate from the political activities of an organization. Certainly this was Justice
Brennan's perspective. See Austin, 110 S. CL at 1404-05 (Brennan, J., concurring). But
the vindication of shareholder rights is not sufficient to justify Michigan's regulation, for
the same reasons it was not sufficient to justify the regulation in Bellotti. The purpose of
protecting shareholders is "belied" by the terms of the statute itself. See Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 794-96. The fact that the statute is underinclusive, as it does not prohibit other
forms of political activity, such as issue advocacy or lobbying state legislators, suggests
that protecting shareholder rights is not the purpose of the regulation. Similarly, that
the statute is overinclusive, as it does not authorize corporate candidate advocacy, even
with absolute shareholder ratification, indicates that the regulation aims at something
other than vindicating shareholder rights. Id.
18" Justice Marshall's view assumes that the right of corporations to speak is based
solely on the public's interest in corporate views. Yet the "right to hear" formulation of
First Amendment protection is not based so much on already interested listeners as on
the premise that self-governance requires exposure to antagonistic views. See discussion,
note 47 supra and note 230 infra in this regard.
,,1 Mica CM!p. LAWS § 169.255 (Supp. 1989). See notes 66 & 70 infra for statutory
text.
1go MICH. CoM'. LAWS § 169.254 (Supp. 1989). See note 68 for statutory text supra.
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intended to require public support in the form of political sentiment, rather than money. Yet such a proposition offends the
often quoted purpose of the First Amendment, "'to assure [the]
unfettered interchange of ideas.' "191 Rallying public support is
often the objective of political speech; public support should not
be its prerequisite.1 9 2
Taking Austin's fear of corporate influence together with its
requirement that corporate speech reflect public support, Austin's conception of an attempt to purge corruption becomes indistinguishable from an interest in equalizing the relative effect
of speakers on the outcome of election. Insofar as the Michigan
Act attempts to redistribute speech according to its relative support, it regulates speakers into proportional voices. The difference between this attempt to purge corruption, and an attempt
to "equalize the relative ability to affect the outcome of elections," is therefore only a difference in degree, not a difference
in kind.
To supplement Austin's three statements about the compelling nature of Michigan's interest, the majority cited only a few
other cases.1 3 Perhaps the Court's position was that since the
issue of corporate domination was not de novo before the Court,
it did not warrant much discussion. Yet even though Austin was
the first time the Court held an expenditure regulation constitutional as applied, the Court announced its holding as if it were
merely reciting established principles of jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the Court's use of precedent was too perfunctory to be
effective.

""Buckley,
(1957)).
192

424 U.S. at 13 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484

Buckley expressly made this point in striking a limitation on a candidate's ex-

penditures from personal funds. "The candidate, no less that any other person, has a
First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and
tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other candidates." Buckley,
424 U.S. at 52. See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945) (the First Amendment protects "he who seeks to rally support for any social, business, religious or political cause.").
"' Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397-98 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47; Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 496-97, 500-01; Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 258;
and Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26). These citations were not specific to Michigan's interest, but appeared as part of the majority's general discussion of the Court's recognition
of corruption-prevention as a justification of election finance regulation, and precedential
treatment of attendant constitutional issues. See notes 194-222 and accompanying text
infra.
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The Austin majority misplaced its reliance on some of the
authority it cited. In the first instance, the Court read Buckley
as distinguishing expenditures from contributions but only as
concerned individual, rather than corporate, donors. ' " Yet "person" as defined in FECA for purposes of FECA's expenditure
provisions included "an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, or any other organization or group of persons."195 In fact the Buckley Court specifically noted the "broad
definition of person" as it related to the expenditure provisions, 9 and the Court itself referred to "individuals and
groups,' 1 9 7 "persons and groups,"19 8 "persons and organiza-

tions," 199 and "person[s] and association[s], ' 200 throughout its
discussion. It was somewhat surprising, then, for the Austin majority to proceed on the assumption that Buckley was not controlling with regard to regulating corporate expenditures.
A second problem with the Austin majority's use of authority was that the opinion attributed to Conservative PoliticalAction Comm. an acknowledgement that the "'compelling government interest in preventing corruption support[s] the restriction
of political war chests funneled through the corporate form.'""
While the quoted passage does in fact appear in Conservative
Political Action Comm., it is actually a statement of the rationale used in Right to Work, and cited by Chief Justice Rehnquist
in Conservative Political Action Comm. for the purpose of distinguishing the two cases.20 2 Indeed the Chief Justice declared
that while such a rationale supported the finding in the contributions context of Right to Work, it was insufficient in Conservative Political Action Comm. for restricting PAC
expenditures. °3
I9' Id.
195

at 1397.
18 U.S.C. § 591(g) (1976) (repealed 1980).

'"Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 n.45.
197

199

Id. at 39.
Id. at 45.

Id.
Id. at 50.
201 Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397 (quoting Conservotive Political Action Comm., 470
199

200

U.S. at 500-01).
202
Conservative PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. at 500-01.

Id. In Conservative PoliticalAction Comm. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that,
"[w]hile in [Right to Work the Court] held that the compelling governmental interest in
preventing corruption supported the restriction of the influence of political war chests
203
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As progeny of Buckley, both Right to Work and Conservative Political Action Comm. employed the narrow view of cor-

ruption, and consistent with Buckley, determined that contributions gave rise to the opportunity for corruption whereas
expenditures did not.20 4 Austin's reliance on the Right to Work
rationale is diminished further in light of Conservative Political
Action Comm.'s reading that even Right to Work "is consistent
with this Court's holding [in Bellotti] that a corporation's expenditures to propagate its views on issues of general public interest are of a different constitutional stature than corporate
contributions to candidates."2'05 In this way Conservative Political Action Comm. stressed that Right to Work was decided as a
contributions case, and reiterated the basis of Buckley's con-

funneled through the corporate form, in the present case [the Court does] not believe
that a similar finding is supportable .

. . ."

Id.

At best Austin could use Conservative PoliticalAction Comm. for the proposition
that the Court would consider upholding regulations on expenditures after showing a
link between expenditures and corruption or the appearance of corruption. Conservative
PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. at 501. But whether the Court in Austin chose to rely
on Conservative PoliticalAction Comm. or Bellotti for this proposition, that "a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to influence candidate elections," the Court in Austin
did not acknowledge that when previous Courts referred to the opportunity for corruption, those Courts meant the opportunity for improper influence on candidates and officeholders. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26) (emphasis
added). Both Conservative PoliticalAction Comm. and Bellotti utilized Buckley's narrow definition of corruption, Conservative PoliticalAction Comm. stating itself, "The
hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors." Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 497.
Interestingly, the majority in Austin did not dispute the fact that other Courts had
found no showing of quid pro quo corruption with regard to expenditures. Instead, Austin argued that Michigan was concerned with a different type of corruption. Austin, 110
S. Ct. at 1397. Even having distinguished Michigan's view of corruption from that examined by previous Courts, however, Austin still did not address whether there had been
a satisfactory showing of corporate dominance in elections. Id. This is the basis of Justice Scalia's concern that the majority upheld a speech restriction on the mere basis of
"potential harm," as the Court upheld a regulation without a showing that expenditures
gave rise to actual corruption, however defined. Id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I"' See Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 208 (noting "the importance of preventing both
the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption") (citing
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27); Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 496-97
(finding that a limitation on independent expenditures by PACs was "constitutionally
infirm," following the reasoning in Buckley that no tendency "to corrupt or to give the
appearance of corruption" existed in connection with independent expenditures") (referring to Buckley, 424 U.S. 1).
205 Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 495-96.
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struction of corruption as "a subversion of the political process
...
[t]he hallmark of [which] is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors. ' 20 6 Conservative PoliticalAction Comm.
interpreted Right to Work as having upheld the "fundamental
constitutional difference" between expenditures and contributions and as merely extending contribution regulations to nontraditional membership corporations. °7
Austin also cited Massachusetts Citizens to support the legitimacy of Michigan's interest.2 0 8 At the cited page, Massachusetts Citizens itself offered four authorities: 200 the same quotation from Conservative Political Action Comm. taken out of
context, as discussed above, a passage properly attributed to
Right to Work,2"' and statements from two pre-Buckley cases
that involved union activities. Combined, these cases are insufficient to distinguish Michigan's purported interest from an attempt to equalize the influence of speakers on the outcome of an
election. Nor do they require the finding that Michigan's view of
corruption reflected a compelling interest.
Massachusetts Citizens' citation to, and Austin's reliance
on, Right to Work is inapposite because Right to Work was a
contributions case, the restrictions on which have traditionally
required "less compelling justification than restrictions on expenditures. 211 The fact that contributions have been regulated
does not further the argument that expenditures should be. The
Court may be properly criticized for obfuscation when it tries to
substitute the "less compelling justification" (for regulating contributions) for the more compelling one required to justify regulating expenditures. Moreover, the compelling interest served in

208

Id. at 497.

207 Id. at 497, 500.
200 Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1391 (citing Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 257 (1986)
wherein the Court reviewed federal equivalent of Michigan's expenditure provision).
209 Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 257 (citing Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. at 501; Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 207; United States v. International

Union United Auto., Aircraft and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 585

(1957); Pipefitters Local Union v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 416 (1972)).
210 The Court in Massachusetts Citizens described the need to regulate "the substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the
corporate form of organization." Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 257 (quoting Right
to Work, 459 U.S. at 207).
2I Id. at 259. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-22; Conservative PoliticalAction Comm.,
470 U.S. at 501; California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 194,

196-197 (1981).
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Right to Work was the prevention of corruption as Buckley defined it; Right to Work is not precedent for judicial recognition
of a state's interest in equalizing influence on elections.
The remaining two cases cited by Massachusetts Citizens
involved union activities. Surely these cases were useful to the
Court in Massachusetts Citizens, where it examined a federal
regulation that extended to labor unions as well as corporations.
Yet the usefulness of union cases in examining a regulation
aimed only at corporations is questionable, particularly when
the Court has opined about the different imperatives in regulating unions and corporations." 2 It is noteworthy that while an
employee may be compelled to join a union, investors in a corporation are driven by economic choice and strategy. Without regulation, a union member faces the choice of subsidizing political
speech with which he disagrees or giving up his livelihood.2 1 3 Reinvesting one's holdings in a politically compatible corporation is
a difficulty of narrower dimension. Similarly, the concern that
money used for political purposes should not be "money diverted from another source," is more compelling in the context
of union expenditures than corporate expenditures.au Union
funds, collected from membership dues and agency shop fees,
are used exclusively for collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance procedures. 1 5 Corporate treasuries, on the
other hand, serve the more generalized purpose of maximizing
profits, and it is well established that corporate managers enjoy
considerable discretion in determining what furthers the eco22 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34 (finding that reliance on "union" cases was
inapposite because of the "critical distinction . . . that no shareholder has been compelled to contribute anything") Id. See also Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1424 (Kennedy, J.
dissenting) (finding the "disincentives to disassociate" were not "comparable"); Austin,
110 S. Ct. at 1411-12, (Scalia, J. dissenting) (arguing that the requirement that corporations speak through PACs is actually based on protecting the minority shareholder,
which is not a compelling interest, even according to the majority).
212 See Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (Railway Labor Act does not permit union to expend even nonmember agency fees on political causes).
24 Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 258 (regarding the underlying theory of requiring that political expenditures come from segregated funds, established for political
purposes) (quoting Pipefitters, 407 U.S. 385, 423-24, quoting 117 CONG, Rac. 43,381
(1971)).
2'15See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (union may
not compel financial support from employees for activities beyond collective bargaining,
contract administration or grievance adjustment).
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nomic interest of the corporation. 1 6

Thus, it is at least imprecise to impose the reasoning of
these union cases on a discussion about a regulation that does
not affect unions. Nevertheless it is interesting to explore those
pre-Buckley cases for their perception of potential evils in the
electoral process. In United States v. Automobile Workers, for
example, the Court acknowledged the "popular feeling that aggregated capital unduly influenced politics, an influence not
stopping short of corruption. 2

17

The opinion also traced the his-

tory of election law as paralleling "a continuing congressional
concern for elections 'free from the power of money.' "2,8 Similarly, the Pipefitters opinion documented Congress's intention
to "eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on federal
elections."219
Automobile Workers and Pipefitters demonstrate that a
distrust of those in control of large amounts of money has a
strong tradition. What those cases do not justify, and what tradition fails to prove, however, is the constitutionality of statutory enactments born out of that distrust alone. 2 0 To the contrary, the more recent Conservative Political Action Comm.
Court discredited the argument that because PACs spend more
money than individuals the potential for corruption was
greater.221 The Court in Conservative Political Action Comm.

concluded that "such an exchange of political favors for uncoordinated expenditures remain[ed] a hypothetical possibility and
See Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974). To the extent that New
York Telephone Company's $50,000 expenditure to publicize its views on a bond issue
was prompted by civic concern, it was authorized by state corporation law, regardless of
whether the corporation anticipated any benefit. Id. at 854. To the extent that the expenditure was motivated by anticipated benefit, the expenditure was authorized by
traditional corporate benefit rule. Id.
217 Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957) (statute held to prohibit use of
union dues to sponsor commercial television broadcast endorsing political candidate).
218 Id. at 575 (Hearingsbefore House Committee on Elections, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
12, at 28-31 (Mar. 12, 1906) (quoting Samuel Gompers)).
219 Pipefitters,407 U.S. 385, 416 (1972) (statute prohibits union from making political expenditures unless monies have been volunteered by its members for this purpose).
20 See Conservative PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. at 499 (finding in the context
of PACs that "A tendency to demonstrate distrust ... is not sufficient [to establish] the
critical elements to be proved: corruption of candidates or public perception of corruption of candidates.") Id.
22 Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 497-98.
218
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222

nothing more.
It was not enough for the Austin majority to attempt to justify Michigan's regulatory scheme by pointing to a long-term
concern with the problem at which the regulation was aimed.
The Court's reasoning was marred by the superficial use of precedent: the Court misread Buckley as applying to only those expenditures made by individuals; it misapplied the contributions
rationale of Right to Work to an expenditures case; and it misquoted Conservative Political Action Comm. as recognizing a
compelling interest in regulating corporate political war chests.
Furthermore, the Court in Austin should have questioned the
soundness of the dicta in Massachusetts, Citizens, instead of
inappropriately citing it to justify Michigan's view. Unfortunately the Court blithely followed Massachusetts Citizens, complete with its iinderlying assumptions.
B. Application of Austin's Model of Corruption
When Austin predicated so much of its argument on Massachusetts Citizens, it consequently adopted Massachusetts Citizens's underlying assumptions. What is most interesting in this
respect is the reference in Massachusetts Citizens to the marketplace of political ideas, a metaphor coined by Justice Holmes
in his famous Abrams dissent: "[T]he ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. ' 22 3 The Court in Massachusetts Citizens argued that legislative concern over the "corrosive influence" of
corporate war chests was an attempt to protect the integrity of
political marketplace. 224 The Massachusetts Citizens Court reasoned that the integrity of the political marketplace was
threatened when resources which reflect economic success are
spent in the political marketplace. The Court thus justified intervening in the market to stem an "unfair deployment of
225
wealth."
This perspective of "correcting" the market is not without
222 Id.

at 498.

Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S at 257 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
221

224

Id.

.2 Id. at 259.
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support.2 ' Yet regulating against a "corrosive influence" runs
uncomfortably close to unconstitutionally interfering in the electoral process. 227 By requiring that corporate expenditures reflect
public support for their ideas, the Court in Austin strips from
the corporation a legitimate use of political speech, which is to
persuade people to agree with one's ideas. As Bellotti noted,
"corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote;
this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may per225
suade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it.1
Constitutional tradition has assumed an alert public capable
of making informed decisions at the poll. 229 Even if election law
represents a balance of First Amendment interests, 2 0 the Court

2"

See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, 676 (1978)
(The right to know "carries the implication that government, while it may not close the
market[place of ideas], may move to correct its defects and regulate its incidental consequences."); Judge Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality? 82 COLMLt L. REv. 609, 636 (1982)
("[T]he truth-producing capacity of the marketplace of ideas is not enhanced if some are
allowed to monopolize the marketplace by wielding excessive financial resources.").
22 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57.
The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free
society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but the people
- individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and
political committees - who must retain control over the quantity and range of
debate on public issues in a political campaign.
Id.
2 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents Univ. State
of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) (The Constitution "protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing."). Nor is it relevant for constitutional
analysis that money is spent to project speech. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15-17 ("[The] Court
has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of
money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment."). See also Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.. 414, 426-27
n.7 ("The concern that persons who can pay petition circulators may succeed... when
they might otherwise have failed cannot defeat First Amendment rights."); Eastern RR
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961) ("['lo a very
large extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people
to make their wishes known.").
2" See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92 ("[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted
with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider in making their judgment, the source and credibility of the
advocate.").
See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 807 (White, J., dissenting):
One of the . . . [First Amendment's] functions, often referred to as the right to
hear or receive information, is to protect the interchange of ideas. Any communication of ideas, and consequently any expenditure of funds which makes the
communication of ideas possible, it can be argued, furthers the purposes of the

"'
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has emphasized the limited nature of those restrictions it has
23 1
upheld and the availability of alternate avenues of expression.
The Court's ultimate preference should be for allowing speech.
As Justice Powell argued against government paternalism in
Bellotti, "[I]f there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced by [corporations],
it is a danger contemplated by Framers of the First Amendment.

2 32

In any case, it is not for a legislature (or a court) to

adjust political debate on the basis of what it fears will233be too
successful, and result in a corrosive or distorting effect.

Even Massachusetts Citizens, upon which Austin relied so
thoroughly, may be read as facilitating speech, rather than restricting speech. Although the Court in Massachusetts Citizens
intimated a willingness to address a disparity of influence on
elections by acknowledging the legitimacy of Congress's concern,
nonetheless it did not apply the organizational restraints of the
Act.2 34 Intervention in the political marketplace to equalize

First Amendment. This proposition does not establish, however, that the right
of the general public to receive communications financed by means of corporate expenditures is of the same dimension as that to hear other forms of expression. In the first place ... [i]deas which are not a product of individual
choice are entitled to less First Amendment protection. Secondly, the restriction of corporate speech concerned with political matters impinges much less
severely upon the availability of ideas to the general public than do restrictions
upon individual speech. Even the complete curtailment of corporate communications concerning political or ideological questions not integral to day-to-day
business functions would leave individuals, including corporate shareholders,
employees, and customers, free to communicate their thoughts. Moreover, it is
unlikely that any significant communication would be lost by such a
prohibition.
But cf. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1415 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The premise of our Bill of
Rights, however, is that there are some things - even some seemingly desirable things
- that government cannot be trusted to do. The very first of these is establishing the
restrictions on speech that will assure 'fair' political debate.").
231 See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 ("[Tjhe Act's contribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective
discussion . . ").
23 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792 (citing Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388 (1962)).
2 See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982) ("[T]he State's fear that voters
might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech.") (quoted in Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 426-27 n.7 (1988)).
See also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791 n.31 ("Government is forbidden to assume the task of
ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern themselves.").
...Many commentators are persuaded that the Court in Massachusetts Citizens decided the case on the basis of the right of association protection of the First Amendment,
rather than on corporate self-realization grounds, or the public's right to hear. See dis.
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voices may be accomplished from either of two directions: by enabling a weaker voice, or by restraining a stronger one. Notably,
however, the Massachusetts Citizens Court did not intervene on
MCFL's behalf; the Court took a more laissez-faire approach-it
refrained from imposing restrictions on MCFL. In this respect,
Massachusetts Citizens did not even effect its own dicta, that it
is proper for government to adjust the marketplace of ideas.
The inherent optimism of the marketplace of ideas is undermined when laissez-faire gives way to regulation. Worse still is
the prospect that what legislators find distasteful today will be
termed "corrosive and distorting" tomorrow. As previously
noted by the Court, "we must be particularly wary in assessing
[a regulation] to determine whether it reflects an impermissible
attempt 'to allow a government to control . . . the search for
political truth. ' 235 The problem with Austin's expansive view of
corruption, then, is that it permits a measure of such government control; it allows for a new kind of targeting-from the
nature of the speech, to the nature of its effect, to the identity of
the speaker. Under a quid pro quo analysis, Bellotti focused on
the nature of the speech to determine its constitutional protection.s36 Under the Austin analysis, on the other hand, emphasis
was placed on the source of the speech, the corporation as
speaker, and on its effect. This shift in focus allows legislators a

cussion of different theories underlying First Amendment protections at note 47 supra.
See Charles N. Eberhardt, Note, Integrating the Right of Association with the Bellotti
Right to Hear, 72 CORNELL LAW REvIEw 159 (1986). This argument may explain the
seeming inconsistency between the outcomes in Bellotti and Austin, yet it ignores the
inherent danger of choosing between two theories of First Amendment protection to determine the extent of such protection. Particularly because Austin did not clarify how
much political activity would remove an "ideological" corporation from the exception the
Court carved for small, single issue associations like MCFL, political incorporated associations may be unable to determine at what level of activity they will no longer be
protected by the right of association and only by the lesser interest in the public's right
to hear.
.-Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364, 384 (1984) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
568 (1980)).
" See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and
this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an
individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual
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stronger hand in election regulation, as they need only point to a
disproportionate impact and identify the source to justify content based regulation.
The question after Austin is whether the Court's recognition of such a broad state interest will be the basis upon which
legislators justify other regulations, and with which courts
subordinate legitimate expression. Some assurance that the Austin rationale will be applicable only to "corporations cases"
comes from the other "corporate speech case," Bellotti: "If the
speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that
the State could silence their proposed speech. 2 37 This may not
be prophetic, however, as Austin's expansive view of corruption
has been used in another context already. In Geary v. Renne the
"distorting and corrosive effects" model of corruption was proffered to justify an amendment of the California constitution
banning political party endorsements of candidates for nonpartisan city, county, school and judicial offices. 238 While the Supreme Court ultimately held that the First Amendment question
was not justiciable in that case,23 9 it is noteworthy that both the
original panel 24 0 and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals en

banc2" considered an application of Austin's rationale. While
acceptable to the original panel, on rehearing, the Ninth Circuit
found the analogy between corporations and political parties
flawed, due in part to the "'long history of regulation of corporate political activity.' -1242 This suggests that other courts may
use Austin to support the proposition that an historical fear is
sufficient justification for diminished protection under the First
Amendment. At best Austin stands for the alternative proposition that less is more, at least as concerns corporate political
speech.

217 Id. The different results in Austin and Bellotti may be attributed to the different
emphasis, both in what constituted corruption, and the nature of First Amendment
protection.
2.8 911 F.2d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct.
2331 (1991).
29 111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991).
240 880 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1989).
21 911 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).

242 Id.

at 284 (citations omitted).
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CONCLUSION

The importance of Austin is that it represents a significant
departure from Buckley and its progeny. Where Buckley relied
on a narrow definition of corruption to come to its holding, Austin considerably broadened the scope of corruption to justify upholding a restriction on political expenditures. Although dicta in
Massachusetts Citizens indicated the susceptibility of corporations to expenditure regulations, Austin was the first to hold
such expenditure regulations constitutional as applied. The flaw
in Austin then, was not so much that its strayed from precedent
as that the Court too easily accepted a value-laden rationale for
doing so. Fortunately, the weaknesses in the Court's argumentation also suggest that the holding in Austin will be self-limiting:
a paranoia about corporate war chests will not lend itself to justifying restrictions aimed at any individual or association besides corporations.
Miriam Cytryn

